01Keys
Made on your device. Kept there.
When a site asks for a new passkey, Passkey.bond answers the WebAuthn call itself. It generates an ECDSA P-256 (ES256) key pair locally, builds a standard attestation response, and stores the private key in the browser's extension storage. To sign in, it signs the site's challenge with that key. The private key is never sent to the site, and never to us.
- Passkeys are bound to the site's domain (the relying party ID), so a look-alike phishing domain gets nothing. Related-origin requests are checked against the site's own
/.well-known/webauthnlist. - Each credential carries Passkey.bond's AAGUID
2391d29c-2806-4960-a51b-7c18e5da7976, so sites can tell which authenticator holds it. - Two-factor codes (RFC 6238 TOTP and RFC 4226 HOTP) are computed locally with HMAC-SHA1, SHA-256 or SHA-512. QR codes are decoded on the device. Nothing is uploaded.
Source: src/crypto/webauthn.ts, src/crypto/totp.ts